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Common Sense And.Conf Iict Of Laws
A Welcome Change
AARON D. TWERSKI*
Pittsburgh,Pennsylvania

C

OMMON SENSE is beginning to come
to conflict of laws. Progress is slow and
the steps are being made with hesitation
but what is important in the final analysis is that some courts are beginning to
talk the kind of language and write the
kind of opinions that lawyers can understand. This has not been the tradition in
the conflicts area. The courts have shifted
from allegiance to the arid conceptualism
of Restatement 11 and its outworn theory
of vested rights to an equally dogmatic
theory of rigid interest 2 analysis. Dogma
does not make good law and results in the
conflicts cases bear out this thesis convincingly. The search for justice in general and
"conflicts justice", in particular admittedly
requires a theoretical framework; but, a
heavy dose of common sense and genuine
sense of balance is a value of equal importance. It is to the development of that
sense of balance that this article will address itself.
To demonstrate what I consider the
common sense gap" in the decisional process, I shall call on two recent cases one
that is wed to the old vested rights theorythe other an extreme application of inter*[Author's Note] Following the decision in Cipolla v. Shaposka which is discussed at length in
my article the editors of the Duquesne Law Review undertook an extensive symposium to explore the views of some of the outstanding academic scholars on this important case. The symposium appears in Volume 9 of the Duquesne Law
Review, pp. 347-465. The present article reflects
a substantial revision of my comments which appeared in that symposium, in an article entitled:
Enlightened Territorialism and Professor CaversThe Pennslyvania Method, 9 DuqLRev 373 (1971).
The scope of the comments in the Duquesne Law
Review symposium are broad indeed. They reflect
the great diversity of opinion in this field today in
a striking fashion.
1RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS (1934).
2The decisions of the New York and Wisconsin
courts are notorious for their rigidity. Conklin v.
Horner, 38 Wis2d 468, 157 NW2d 579 (1968) and
Tooker v. Lopez, 24 NY2d 569, 301 NYS2d 519,
2M9 NE2d 394 (1969) are examples of tre extreme
applications of interest analysis.
sCavers, Cipolla and Conflict Justice, 9 DuqLRev
360 (1970).
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est analysis. In 1966 the Supreme Court
of Connecticut in Landers v. Landers4 was
asked to pass on a complaint by a wife
against her husband which alleged that the
wife was injured in Virginia when due to
the gross negligence of the husband he lost
control of his car. As a result, the car went
off the highway and crashed into a creek.
The cause of action was brought in Connecticut which permits a wife to sue a
husband in tort-interspousal immunity
having been abrogated by statute.5 One
would think that this case should have
provided no problem to the Connecticut
court. Since both the husband and wife
were Connecticut domiciliaries and the
question before the court was whether a
wife had the capacity to sue her husband,
there should have been no difficulty in
deciding the case for the plaintiff. The
court found for the defendant. Why? Because in Virginia a wife lacks the capacity
to sue her husband. Since the accident took
place in Virginia under the theory of lce
loci delicti that law must inexorably govern
this cause of action. The rights of the
parties were vested at the moment of impact as defined by the law of the state in
which the impact took place. If one were
to ask why should Virginia law governing
interspousal immunity govern Connecticut
4153 Conn 303, 216 A2d 183 (1966).
5Public Acts 1877 c. 114 (as amended, General
Statutes, c. 809).

Page 340

INSURANCE COUNSEL JOURNAL -

July, 1971

domiciliaries, it is difficult to come up with

trip to Brunswick, Maine, where his broth-

a rational answer. Interspousal immunity
is supported by two reasons; (1) that a law
suit between husband and wife would disturb the family harmony and (2) the fear
that the suit will not be an adversary one
and that both husband and wife will collude to defraud the insurance company.r
Given these policy reasons behind the doctrine of interspousal immunity, why should
Virginia law govern? The state that is
most concerned with family harmony, in
this instance, is Connecticut. Having decided that interspousal suits should be permitted, why should Connecticut be concerned with how Virginia deals with Virginia domiciliaries? As to the second policy
reason for the immunity based on the fear
of collusive suits, Connecticut has made
the judgment that it can adequately control the fraud problem and that it is more
important that there be adequate recovery
for the injured plaintiff. Furthermore, the
car was insured in Connecticut and premiums paid presumably on the assumption
that there would be no interspousal immunity. It would appear that a miscarriage
of justice has occurred when the plaintiffwife was denied recovery merely because
the accident occurred in Virginia, whose
law denies recovery since the only relevant
law to the problem which the court faced
was that of Connecticut., Yet, the inexorable logic of lex loci led to the application
of Virginia law. By analyzing the interest
and policies behind the rule of interspousal
immunity, it would have become clear that
this apparent conflict was in reality a
"false" one. A moderate dose of common
sense would have led the court to the correct result. Reliance on the dogmatic vested rights theory led to an irrational result.

er resided and where they had mutual
business interests. Two days after his arrival he went for a ride in a car owned by
his sister-in-law and driven by his brother.
Mr. Miller was killed when the vehicle suddenly swerved off the road and crashed
into a bridge railing. Some three months
after the accident the decedent's brother
and sister-in-law who had been Maine
residents, returned to reside in New York.
Shortly thereafter, the decedent's wife filed
suit against the decedent's brother and
sister-in-law for the wrongful death of her
husband. The defendants raised as a partial
defense the $20,000 limitation on wrongful
death in effect in Maine at the time of the
accident. The court phrased the issue in
the following manner:

A recent case decided by the New York
Court of Appeals demonstrates rather well
that bad results are not limited to those
courts which still follow the vested rights
theory. In Miller v. Miller" the New York
Court demonstrated that a modern interest analysis approach, if rigidly applied,
could be as much at odds with common
sense as the old vested rights theory. In
August 1961, the late Earl Miller, a resident
of New York, embarked on a short business
,W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §116
(3d ed. 1964).
7See text accompanying footnote 45 for a partial

rebuttal to this argument.
822 NY2d 12, 290 NYS2d 734, 237 NE2d 877
(1968).

The question presented by this appeal is
whether the $20,000 limitation on recovery
in wrongful death actions should be applied in this action for the benefit of the
resident wife and children of a New York
decedent against New York resident defendants where the accident took place in
Maine and the defendants resided there at
the time of the accident. 9
One would think that this was an easy
case to decide. A Maine driver was driving
his brother, a New York resident, who was
visiting Maine for a short ride which began
in Maine and was to end in Maine. It
would appear rather obvious that defendant should have the law of Maine which
limited wrongful death recovery to $20,000
apply to this accident. The court indulging in a fanciful interest analysis found for
the plaintiff. It reasoned that. New York
had a strong interest in protecting its domiciliaries (the decedent's family) so that
they be adequately compensated for the
loss of the "bread winner." Having estab.lished a strong New York interest the court
set about destroying Maine's interest in
applying its wrongful death limitation to
the case at bar. The court reasoned that
in light of unlimited liability for cases in
which the plaintiff was not killed it could
not conclude that the Maine defendant
"relied" on the Maine wrongful death limitation in purchasing appropriate insurance
coverage. With respect to the liability of
the insurer and its expectations the court
concluded that the insurer must have expected that it might have to pay off claims
oId. 237 NE2d at 878.
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for accidents outside of Maine in which
the limited liability would not apply. The
court also found it to be relevant that the
defendant had moved to New York following the accident thus diminishing any interest Maine might have in "regulating
the rights of its citizens" (protecting them
from high speculative wrongful death
claims).
One can hardly refrain from reacting
with unrestrained cynicism to the New
York court's decision. It would seem rather
elementary that Maine would have a
rather significant interest in applying its
law to a set of events in which the defendants were Maine domiciliaries when
those events transpired in Maine. If interest analysis leads to a different result
then it is at odds with common sense. It
is possible-indeed it is quite easy-to take
issue with the New York court's evaluation
of the interests. By manipulating the interest analysis discussion we could reach a
different and sensible conclusion. However, the fault with that approach is that
it admits the very validity\ of the system
(interest analysis) which requires, in this
author's opinion, serious re-evaluation.
THE TERRITORIAL PROBLEM
At the outset of this piece it was suggested that both the vested rights theory
and the rigid interest analysis approach
were often at odds with common sense.
However, common sense is not a commodity one can purchase at a supermarket,
nor can it be sold to an appellate court as
the sole grounds in support of a position
that one is advocating. One has some duty
to articulate the factors that are ingredients
of a common sense approach to choice of
law. It is this author's opinion that the
major factor which has upset -the analytical balance in conflict of laws is the inability of courts and scholars alike to appreciate the appropriate role that territoralism must play in a rational choice of law'
system.
This statement may at first appear somewhat odd. After all, the First Restatement
of Conflicts and the vested rights theory
gave a pre-eminent role to territorialism.
Under that theory all rights became rigidly
vested depending on the geographical location of the parties at the time the judidical
event took place. Yet, that was precisely
the problem. Territorialism became a

dogma. It was not dealt with as an important factor of the case it was the only
factor. Under such an approach irrational
decisions such as the Landersio case discussed earlier were decided. The reaction to
the territorialism of the "vested righters"
was a total negation of territorial considerations by those positing an interest
analysis. The fruits of that approach are
now visible decisions such as Miller v.
Miller," the New York wrongful death decision. However, the action-reaction syndrome has begun to play itself out. Court
and scholars are attempting to consolidate
the gains earned by the adoption of the
interest analysis. There is evidence that
this process is now well under way.
In March, 1970 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Cipolla v. ShaposkaY2
The facts in the case are quite simple. The
defendant, John Shaposka, a Delaware resident, had an accident while driving in
Delaware. The plaintiff, Michael Cipolla
was a passenger in the car. It appears that
the defendant-Shaposka was driving the
plaintiff to his home in Pennsylvania to
pick up some tools that the defendant had
lent the plaintiff. The accident occurred
in Delaware and the defendant-Shaposka
was driving his father's car which was
garaged, licensed and insured in Delaware.
The conflicts problem was a familiar one.
Delaware has a host-guest statute which
bars recovery in the absence of intentional
or wanton misconduct, Pennsylvania permits recovery for ordinary negligence in
host-guest cases. Process was served on the
defendant in Pennsylvania.
Six years earlier in the now famous
Griffith v. United Airlines a case Pennsylvania had committed itself to the interest
analysis theory. In subsequent cases, the
court had indicated that it would take a
principled approach to deciding such cases
and would not use interest analysis to accomplish an
unconscionable
plaintiff
bias.14 The Cipolla case, however, presented a challenge-it was a true conflicts case.
Since the plaintiff was a Pennsylvania
domiciliary the forum had an interest in
applying its rule permitting a guest to sue
a host thus granting compensation to him.
10Supra, note 4.
IlSupra, note 8.
12439 Pa 563,.267 A2d 854 (1970).
13416 Pa 1, 203 A2d 796 (1964).

14McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa 86, 215 A2d 677
(1966).
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On the other hand, the court acknowledged
that Delaware's interest was substantial in
applying its host-guest rule in favor of the
Delaware defendant. Whatever, the policy
reason behind the host-guest rule 15 it is
abundantly clear that Delaware's interest
in having its law applied in favor of a
Delaware domiciliary while driving in Delaware is an overriding one and its law
should govern. Common sense would reject a contrary finding. To the credit of
the Pennsylvania court they found in favor
of the defendant. Yet, the court was faced
with the problem that the interests of
Pennsylvania were diametrically opposed
to those of Delaware. How were they as
a matter of principle to find against their
own interest?
To aid in resolving this conflict the court
turned to the monumental work of Professor David Cavers of the Harvard Law
School, entitled The Choice of Law Process. Professor Cavers has attempted to
work out what he calls "Principles of Preference"''16 to assist in resolving "true conflict cases. Underlying the Cavers' Principles of Preference is a belief that "territorialism" plays an important role in
choice-of-law. Although, I am in substantial agreement with much of what Professor Cavers advocates it has been my belief that his territorial theory has never
been adequately explained. 17 To the extent that a total rationale has not been
worked out there are instances when a
deeper appreciation for territorialism would
lead one less often to a more balanced and
less plaintiff oriented approach to choiceof-law. A brief exposure to the Cavers'
Principles of Preference seems necessary
at this juncture. It should be emphasized
that a sophisticated and intelligent approach to territorialism is not merely of
academic importance. Territorialism properly understood can provide the defense
with strong arguments to blunt the heavy
plaintiff bias presently operating in the
choice-of-law area. It shall be the author's
objective in the ensuing pages to present
a critique of territorialism and then offer
a new supporting rationale for this doctrine. Throughout the discussion an at15The majority was quite vague as to what it
thought was the policy behind the Delaware hostguest rule. The dissent by Mr. Justice Roberts discussed the question at great length.
16D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS, (1965) at page 139.
-See text accompanying footnotes 18-39.

tempt will be made to integrate the territorial approach with the development case
law under interest analysis.
COMMON SENSE AND PRINCIPLES
OF PREFERENCE
Given a true conflict case a court is
faced with an onerous decision. It could
always prefer its own law thus giving effect to its own state interest and the temptation to do so is great indeed. Yet, the
net effect of this approach as would be to
parochialize the fifty states that make up
this country. Underlying this approach is
the belief that there is no rational way to
decide sensitive choice of law problems.
Admittedly there are tough cases which
present vexing problems-perhaps almost
impossible ones-for satisfactory resolution.
Nevertheless, that is not true of the vast
majority of choice of law problems.
Professor Cavers' Principles of Preference
are devoted to indicating how a state court
can in a balanced way decide a true conflicts case. To demonstrate the operation
of Principle of Preferences the author will
focus on two territorial principles which
deal primarily with tort problems. Principle I declares:
Where the liability laws of the state of injury set a higher standard of conduct or of
financial protection against injury than
do the laws of the state where the person
causing the injury has acted or had his
home, the laws of the state of injury should
detcrmine the standard and the protection
applicable to the case, at least where the
person injured was not so related to the
person causing the injury that the question
should be relegated to the law governing
the relationship.18
Cavers reasons that a state's system of

tort law is designed to safeguard the health
,'nd safety of people within its bounds and
that the system of physical and financial
protection would be impaired if a person
who enters the territory were not subject to
its law. He then argues that since a state's
plan of financial protection for the victims
of violations of its standards includes the
civil liability of the violator, the fact that
the violator would be held to a lower
standard of care or of damage in his home
state are matters of little consequence to

the state of injury. Since all states realize
'SCavers, supra note 16 at 139.
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this need to maintain the integrity of their
rules providing for physical and financial
protection each state would wisely defer
to the state of injury in a true conflict
case, if the state of injury had a higher
standard of conduct or financial protection. 19
Now, all this sounds fine and quite reasonable but I'm afraid it won't wash out.
The arguments simply don't support a
territorial principle. Under traditional
analysis a state has two reasons for enforcing its tort law: (1) Deterence and (2)
compensation.20

In the vast majority of

conflict cases the argument that a state's
higher standard of financial protection
21
deters negligent

conduct

is fatuous.

I

thought the Pennsylvania court in McSwain v. McSwain 22 did a rather nice job
of laying that argument to rest. The Court
was asked to apply Colorado's non-immunity rule to a Pennslyvania husbandwife. Under Pennsylvania law the husband
was immune from suit and plaintiff sought
to apply the law of the state of injury
(Colorado) which permitted interspousal
law suits. The court addressed itself to the
deterrent argument saying:
Unlike resort to a standard of care less
rigorous than that demanded by Colorado
of those who use its highways, resort to the
law of Pennsylvania to bar the instant suit
would have no adverse affect on any deterrence sought by Colorado through the
use of tort liability. Since negligent operation of a motor vehicle invariably involves
some hazard to persons beyond the family
relationship, potential liability remains to
deter unreasonable conduct on the part of
those able to insulate themselves from intrafamily immunity.23
-sId. at 140-141.
20See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS,

§§1-2 (3d ed. 1964).

21lWeintraub, A Method For Solving Conflict
Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELLLQ 215, 228 (1963)
suggests that the dcterent interest is weak because
the "accident prone" highway menace is hardly
deterred by rules governing civil liability. See

James and Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident, Law, 63 HARV L REV 769 (1950) and
KEETON AND O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTEC-

TION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 15-22 (1965).
For a contrary view see Blum and Klaven, Public
Law Perspectives On A Private Law Problem-.
Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U CHI L REV 641
(1964).
22McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa 86, 215 A2d 677
(1966).
231d. at 96, 215 A2d at 683.

With regard to the superior interest of
the state of injury in compensation for the
plaintiff so that he has adequate funds to
pay his doctor and hospital bills (affectionately known as the "medical creditor" interest), it is indeed difficult to make this
point the kingpin of a territorial principle for several reasons. First of all, the
presence of first party insurance (Blue
Cross, Blue Shield, medical pay etc.) has
weakened this argument substantially.
.Furthermore, Cavers himself has decided
that his first territorial principle survives
even in the absence of a strong compensation interest on the part of the state of
injury. Cavers raises the problem of what
ought a court to do with a plaintiff who
is a visitor from out of state who seeks
the protection of the higher standard of
financial protection of the state of injury
which would be denied to him in his home
state.2 4

In a situation where the state of

injury would satisfy its need for payment
of medical and hospital costs it is hard to
see why the state of injury has any interest
in providing more liberal compensation
to the out-of-state plaintiff at the expense
of its own citizen. To respond to this most
difficult question, Cavers makes the following observation:
This contention neglects the consideration
that the financial protection a state has
prescribed, being a part of its provision
for the general security, is in part a sanction for wrongfully causing harm. As a
consequence its purposes include elements

of deterrence and retribution even though
it may be couched in essentially compensatory terms. 2 5

I believe we have now come full circle.
In the absence of a compensatory interest
in the state of injury we must view its
compensatory scheme as furthering deterrent goals. But, the deterrent goals are not
really meaningful since we have plenty of
deterrent clout in the absence of this particular plaintiff's recovery. 26 Is then Cavers'
first principle of preference built on a
foundation of quicksand? I think not, but
one can hardly be satisfied with the rationale offered in its defense.
The second Principle of Preference is
most important to our discussion since it
24Cavers, supra note 16 at 143.
251d. at 144.
26See note 22.
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was directly relied on by the Cipolla
court.2 7 It provides:

Where the liability laws of the state in
which the defendant acted and caused an
injury set a lower standard of conduct or
of financial protection than do the laws
of the home state of the person suffering
the injury, the laws of the state of conduct
and injury should determine the standard
of conduct or protection applicable to the
case, at least where the person injured was

ware host-guest rule is the fear that the
guest and host may collude to defraud the
insurer.3 1 Since the purpose of Delaware
law is not to affect the level of defendant's
conduct by encouraging him to take risks

not so related to the person causing the
injury that the question should be relegated to the law governing the relation2s
ship.

with his passenger guests, we remain with
our concern that the Delaware insurer may
be defrauded by collision between the guest
and host. However, our concern now is for
the insurer and not the principal defendant. And to be consistent we must say
that it is "unfair" to the insurer (not the
defendant) to subject him to this surprise
liability. It would seem that Justice Roberts has much the better argument on
this point:

The facts in Cipolla concerned a Pennsylvania plaintiff-passenger injured in Delaware by a Delaware host. The court analyzed the case before it as a "real conflict" case since Delaware had a defendantprotecting host-guest rule and Pennsylvania
the domicile of the plaintiff sought to protect its domiciliaries by granting them 29comIt
pensation from negligent defendants.
would appear that the facts in Cipolla are

[If] the majority means that the insurance
company, here Allstate, relied on not being held liable when setting its rates, I
agree with Professor Morris that (t)he
theory . . . is tautological. The rules of
liability are to be dictated by insurance
practices which are in turn, dictated by
the rules of liability. All that can be concluded from such a premise is that what32
ever is, Should be." '

tailor made for this second principle. Yet,
when we probe to find the rationale behind this liability-denying principle the
reasons are rather unsatisfying:
Consider the response that would be accorded a proposal that was the opposite
of this principle if it were advanced
against a person living in the state of injury on behalf of a person coming there
from a state having a higher standard of
care of financial protection. The proposal thus advanced would require the community the visitor entered to step up its
standards of behavior for his greater safety
or lift its financial protection to the level
to which he was accustomed. Such a pro30
posal would be rejected as unfair.
Unfair? Why? The answer must be because a Delaware citizen ought not to be
exposed to greater liability than he planned on. He would be surprised even
shocked to find that while driving in Delaware he is subject to Pennsylvania law.
But, now we are far afield from an interest
analysis. Lest we forget, this case deals with
a host-guest conflict. Assume for the moment that the policy expressed by the Dela27439 Pa at 567, 267 A2d at 856.
28Cavers, supra note 16 at 146.
29See note 27.
3oCavers, supra note 16 at 146.

Even if we agree with Justice Roberts
that the purpose behind the Delaware hostguest rule is to protect the generous host
from an ungrateful guest 33 it is difficult to
generate much enthusiasm for an "unfair
surprise" argument when the host was
driving a Pennsylvanian to his home in
Pennsylvania. Had the accident taken
place after the crossing of the state lines
in Pennsylvania I rather think the court

would have found for plaintiff and would
not have been overly concerned with the
surprise of the defendant. And even, if
the court would have seen fit to adopt
Cavers' fifth principle of preference s4 favoring the law of the state in which the
31As noted earlier, one can only guess how the
majority read. the purpose behind the Delaware
host-guest rule. Only the dissent indulges in an
in-depth analysis as to the policy behind the statute. In the discussion no question is raised as to
the applicability of Delaware law in a totally domestic Delaware case where the motorist is uninsured. Although Delaware law will undoubtedly ap-

ply, if host-guest collusion is the policy behind the
host-guest rule it has no relevance to the uninsured motorist case. This leads to the curious
situation that Delaware will apply its law to a
domestic situation when it furthers no rational
purpose to do so. This author categorically rejects
such nonsense.
32439 Pa 572, 267 A2d at 859.
331d. at 858.
34Cavers, supra note 16 at 177.
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host-guest relationship was entered into;
it would have done so to further values
other than those of unfair surprise to the
defendant.

5

If the unfairness which trou-

bles Cavers and the Cipolla court stems
from the fear that a defendant should have
the right to plan for his liability exposure
we must assume that he is uninsured (for
if he is insured the concern belongs to the
insurer) . Surely, territorialism is not built
on the back of the uninsured motorist.
If I may hazard an educated guess, it
would be that Cavers' territorialism is more
potent than the rationale offered to support it.36 To support my "guesstimate" I
should like to draw on a much discussed
choice-of-law case arising from the embattled New York Court of Appeals, Tooker
v. Lopez.37 It will be recalled ihat the
tragic events of that case arose entirely in
the state of Michigan. Plaintiff's and Defendant's deceased daughters, both New
York residents, were co-eds attending Michigan State University. They and a third
fellow student, a resident of Michigan embarked on a local Michigan trip which
ended in the death of the two New Yorkers.
The students were all in residence at the
University and the trip was "intrinsically
and exclusively a Michigan trip, concerned
only with Michigan places, roads and conditions" s s The choice-of-law problem arose
because New York has no host-guest rule
and Michigan denies recovery in host-guest
cases in the absence of "gross negligence or
willful misconduct" on the part of the defendant.
3
5Cavers has serious qualms about Principle V.
In certain instances such as husband-wife domiciled
in a marital-immunity state who have an accident
in a non-immunity state, Cavers is willing to recognize the validity of his fifth principle of preference favoring the law of the marital domicile which
denies recovery. Although in McSwain v. McSwain,
supra note 22, the court analyzed the case as a false
conflict by negating Colorado's interests it is possible to read the case as a true conflict situation in

which the'court has decided the case in accordance

with Cavers' Principle V. See discussion of Elston
v. Industrial Lift Truck Co. infra at text accompanying footnotes 62-64. For another instance in
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied a
Cavers' principle of preference without specifically
alluding to it.
36The author recalls Professor Cavers' presentation at a round table discussion during the Association of American Law School convention in December 1969. He intimated at that time that his
principles of preference might well apply in a false
conflict setting.
3724
NY2d 569, 301 NYS2d 519, 249 NE2d 394
(1969).
381d. at 593, 301 NYS2d at 539, 249 NE2d at 409.
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The New York Court, in this case found
for plaintiff and saddled the New York defendant with its higher standard of financial protection. In doing so, the court
found it necessary to determine whether
this case was a true or false conflict case.
In a case almost exactly on point, Dym v.
Gordon,39 the New York court had deter-

mined that this law-fact pattern was a
true conflict. In Tooker, the court changed
its mind:
The teleological argument advanced by
some (see Cavers, Choice-of-law Process,
p.2 98 ) that the guest statute was intended
to assure the priority of injured nonguests in the assets of a negligent host, in
addition to the prevention of fraudulent
claims overlooks not only the statutory history but the fact that the statute permits
recovery by a guest who can establish that
the accident was due to the gross negligence of the driver . . . The only justifica-

tion for discrimination between injured
guests which can withstand logical as well
as constitutional scrutiny . . . is that the
legitimate purpose of the statute prevention of fraudulent claims against local insurers or the protection of local automobile owners-is furthered by increasing the
guests' burden of proof. This purpose can
never be vindicated when the insurer is a
New York carrier and the defendant is
sued in the courts of this state. Under such
circumstances, the jurisdiction enacting
such a guest statute has absolutely no interest in the application of its law.40
Thus, New York has in this case on the
basis of an interest analysis negated the
Colorado interests which it had conjured
up in Dym. The result-a false conflict
case. I should like to create a hypothetical
variant to this case by supposing that the
Michigan court had spoken in the interim
between Dym and Tooker and had made
it crystal clear that the only policy reason
supporting its host-guest rule was the
"fraud on insurer" rationale. Michigan's
Supreme Court being the highest appellate
court of the state is presumptively the final
authority when it comes to the interpretation of statutes passed by the Michigan
legislature. It will do no good to rail at

the Michigan court for failing to perceive
3916

NY2d 120, 262 NYS2d 463, 209 NE2d 792

(1965).
4024 NY2d at 575, 301 NYS2d at 523, 249 NE2d
at 397.
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Caver's teleological aiguments. They have
spoken with finality. Michigan's statute
has one purpose and one purpose onlythe prevention of fraud against insurance
companies by a colluding host and guest.
Query. Now that this is a false conflict
will Cavers argue for the application of
New York law? I think not. Cavers has
made it altogether too clear that he is
greatly concerned with the development
of a "statute personal" as the method for
resolving conflicts problems. 41 One does
not, except in the rarest of situations, travel
in the United States with the tough tortlaw of his home state on his back. But, if
we are to apply a territorial rule even in
a false conflict setting, then we must openly admit a naked territorial bias unsupported by an interest analysis. Have we
returned (heaven forbid) to Restatement
I?
ENLIGHTENED TERRITORIALISM
What is missing today in choice-of-law
analysis is a Iiftle bit of "soul." In the
process of destroying Restatement I there
was a heavy intellectual investment made
• . . too heavy. Rules of law either furthered a particular policy or didn't-it was
as simple as all that. We created categories
called "false conflict" and "true conflict"useful analytical tools to be sure-but they
have gotten away from us. They have become our masters rather than our servants.
A reappraisal as to the multitude of functions which law plays in our society is in
order.
EXPECTATION AND
SCHIZOPHRENIA
When I wake in the morning I expect
the sun to shine. In the evening, I expect
darkness to fall. Do these expectations have
juridical significance? I believe they do.
Those positing an interest analysis would
argue that their significance arises from
the fact that expectations affect conduct.12
41Cavers, supra note 16 at 150-157.
421t is clear that Mr. Justice Roberts believes
that choice-of-law expectancies in the tort area
have value only as a planning tool. If it would not
lead to an alteration of either of the parties' behavior the expectancies are irrelevant. Cipolla at
859. In this assumption Justice Roberts is in good
company. See Weintraub, A Method For Solving
Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL LQ 215.
238 (1963); Currie, CONFLICT, CRISIS AND
CONFUSION IN NEW YORK, 1963 DUKE LJ 1,

I undertake certain activities with an
awareness of the amount of light that will
be available to me. I suggest, however,
that expectations play a far more potent
role in our life style. There is a regularity
and rhythm to life in which the familiarthe habitual plays a vital role. At times it
affects conduct but even when it does not
affect conduct, it affects our sense of tranquillity. A meteor streaking along in the
sky thousands of miles from us is of interest because it is a departure from the
norm. We can take this departure from
the norm with a fair degree of equanimity.
If, however, we should go outside on a
clear night in which the moon is clearly
visible and find no stars it would upset us
no end. It would upset us not because we
depend on starlight, but because we have
the right to believe in the regularity of
nature.
Law is no stranger to human activity. If
we live in a world of nature-we also live
in a world of law. A Delaware driver, on
a trip in Delaware expects Delaware law
to apply. He may be driving a Pennsylvania guest to his home in Pennsylvania
but his expectations prior and subsequent
to any accident is that whatever the Delaware law may be it will apply to him. It
is immaterial whether it affects his conduct.
People have a right to expect a regularity
and rhythm from the law. If this is what
those who argue for certainty as a conflict
of law value are concerned with then they
have a point in their favor.
It appears to me that this is not the
standard stare decisis type of argument.
Change is part and parcel of the common
law and the populace has learned to live
Reprinted in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAY ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 690-705 (1963); LEFLAR, AMERICA CONFLICTS LAW §§ 106, 111
(1959); Leflar, Conflict Law, More On Choice Influencing Consideration, 54 CALIF L REV 1584,
1594 (1966). For judicial approval of. this theme
see Clark v. Clark, 107 NH 351, 222 A2d 205 (1966)
and Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis2d 578, 151 NW2d
664 (1967).
After completion of this article the author was
pleased to find that Professor Amos Shapira has
placed the "expectancy" problem in a broader
perspective. He argues that the crucial question in
assessing private interests in choice-of-law litigation should be the following:
-[c]an one justly charge a party with a timely prior
notice regarding the potential transnational ramifications of the relationship at bar?" Shapira, Protection of Private Interests In the Choice-Of-Law
Process: The Principle Of Rational Connection Between Parties And Laws, 24 SW LJ 574, (1970).
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with it. What is difficult to accept is the
notion that "time and space elements"
play no role whatsoever in the legal framework of choice-of-law. I think we rather
underestimate the embarrassment of the
lawyer in the Cipolla case who had to explain to the defendant that he was being
dragged through a trial because no one was
quite sure which law governed his activities. The essence of a normal human existence is the ability to integrate ones experience. We can provide for the throwout
and the bizarre but it must be just thatbizarre. To demean "time and space" in
the law of conflicts is to deny an important
facet of the human experience. Delaware
drivers driving in Delaware deserve Delaware law-for better or for worse. When
the bizarre becomes the norm-we destroy
the norm. The schizophrenic is the human
symbol of this distorted point of view. It
behooves those who advocate fragmented
choice-of-law theory to reconsider normal
expectancies as an appropriate function of
the law.
Lest it be said that I am attacking the
"interesters" as the cause of mental disease in this country (some of my students
swear it is true) let me emphasize again
that I am only advocating territorialism as
a normal operating principle. We can and
will provide for the throwout and will do
so honestly, reflecting the teaching of the
interest analysis. But, the base rule should
be a territorial one.
LAW AND THE HUMAN RESPONSE
The "false conflict" dogma has another
glaring fault. It has been said and it bears
repeating that determining the interests or
policies behind

both common law and

statutory rules is a risky business. 43 Jurisprudence becomes a deadly game rather
than a philosopher's musings. But, if we
are to become jurisprudes we had better
be good ones. It appears to me that the
governmental interest analysis has missed
some rather basic jurisprudential points in
the development of its theory.
Let me spin a tale for you. If you are
married and have married friends, I would
expect that you have experienced something like this. You invite a young married
couple over to dinner. During the conver43Rosenberg, Two Views On Kell v. Henderson,
An Opinion For the New York Court of Appeals,
67 COLUM L REV 459, 464 (1967) and Cavers,
supra note 16 at 96-101.
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sation the husband makes a not so funny
remark about his mother-in-law. No one
laughs. Before very long the young bride
is in wars and the husband enraged. After
the young guests leave the host husband
and wife carry on the argument-each taking sides. The next morning the host-wife
calls the young bride and offers quasimotherly advice. It is a topic of conversation in the hosts home for at least a week.
Now let me vary the hypothetical just a
little. Instead of the argument between
the young bride and her husband taking
place in the home of the host it takes
place at another friends house. After the
quarrel Mrs. Friend waits until the young
couple leaves and then calls her best friend
Mrs. X who also knows the young bride
and relates the story to her. Mrs. X may
or may not relate the story to her husband.
It certainly won't be the basis of discussion
in the X household for a week. Andl Mrs.
X will definitely not get on the phone and
call the young bride to offer motherly advice.
I would suggest that in conflicts parlance
the first hypothetical I presented was a
false conflict. Why should a husband and
wife involve themselves in the martial problems of dinner guests. It would seem to
be "none of their business" or "officious
intermeddling.". And, if it is their business
why in Case Two do the very same friends
remain uninvolved when the story is related to them second hand?
To me the answer to this problem is
charmingly simple. Human beings are by
nature "officious intermeddlers." If we
ask what engages human beings in the process of intermeddling, I think we should
find a host of causes. In some instances,
it is the relationship between the people
involved, in others the problem is one
which touches not only the combatants
but also has tangential affects on others not
directly involved. But, clearly one factor
which leads human beings to react is the
very sight of an injustice. "Seeing is believing" and "seeing is reacting." When
we react we need tools of justice to react
with. This is the law in all its glory.
It has become an article of faith that in
a false conflicts case the law of only one
state has any claim to application. Yet, if
we view some of the basic false conflict
situations it would seem to me that this
principle is open to serious question. Assume a husband-wife from a no immunity
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state who have an accident in an immunity
state or a host:guest who started their trip
in a non host-guest (common law) jurisdiction who have an accident in a host
guest jurisdiction. The interest dogma
teaches that since the state that imposes
the immunity or disability on recovery in
each instance has no interest in denying
recovery it should not intermeddle and impose its law since it furthers no state policy
to do so. In a recently published article,
Professor Sedler in dealing with the problems of characterization aptly described
many of the immunity type statutes and
policies as "anti-tort. '" 44

In

other words

the conflict between the policies of the
competing laws are not conflicts arising
from differing resolution to tort problems
but because one state has seen fit to foster
policies over and above normal tort-compensatory policies-they are thus "antitort." He then reasons:
Since the defenses of family immunity,
charitable immunity and guest relationship are grounded in policies other than
those to be advanced by that area of the
law we call tort and are in fact directly
antithetical to those polices, the state of
injury has no interest in granting that
kind of immunity. This- issue does not
involve a tort problem, and the state of
primary reference-the state having an interest in granting the immunity claimedis elsewhere. The law of that state should
be consulted first and if immunity is not
given by the law of that state, there is
no reason to allow the defense. 45
I disagree. When a state makes an "antitort" policy determination it is making a
policy judgment of the highest order.
Whether 'its judgment is that the family
order will be disturbed or that parties will
conclude against insurance companies-its
judgment is a moral one. To say that it is
a localized judgment and that this high
priority moral statement is for local consumption only is to deny the potency of
the very decision to negate normal compensatory policies.
When an accident occurs within a state's
boundaries it would seem presumptuous
to tell the state that its sense of morality
is irrelevant to events that have transpired
44Sedler, Characterization, Identification of the
Problem Area, and The Policy-Centered Conflict
of Laws: An Exercise in Judicial Method, 2 RUTGERS-CAMDEN LJ 8 (1970).
451d. at 54.

July, 1971

within. Family harmony and insurance
fraud are national; not local, problems. If
a problem arises in which the human tendency to react has been called upon, we
can have little to say if the human tendency to impose one's own notion of right
or wrong to the problem is engaged. We
have negated the experential in the law
and because of it our conflicts law is the
poorer. Edmund Cahn in his classic work
The Sense of Injustice put it very well:
Why do we speak of the "sense of injustice"
rather than the sense of justice? Because
"justice" has been so beclouded by naturallaw writings that it almost inevitably brings
to mind some ideal relation or static condition or set of perceptual standards,
while we are concerned, on the contrary
with what is active, 'vital, and experential
in the reactions of human beings. Where
justice is thought of in the customary manner as an ideal mode or condition, the human response will be merely contemplative and contemplation bakes no loaves.
But the response to a real or imagined instance of injustice is something quite different; it is alive with movement and
warmth in the human organism. (Emphasis added)
I do not mean to imply that the false
conflict category is meaningless. Its input
is important but not conclusive on the
resolution of conflict problems. It tells
us that in certain instances it would' be
far wiser for a court to say this is "less my
business" than "yours." However, as the
"time and space" aspects of the case become more related to the state of injury,
it becomes more "their" business in that
the human reaction to the case becomes
more vital. I rather agree with Professor
Cavers that Dym v. Gordon4 6 was a good
4
case and express my dismay at its demise.
Because writ all over the case was the inability of the majority to wrench itself
away from its human reaction to a case
which was more a "Colorado" case than a
"New York" case.
LAW AS AN EDUCATOR
The pure "interest analysis" theorists
have failed to perceive another fundamental function of the law. Its educational dimension is a matter of rather substantial
46See note 39.
47See Cavers, supra note 16, Appendix at 293.
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significance. To demonstrate this function
in a conflicts setting I propose to call on an
excellent Cavers' hypothetical. It will be
recalled that in the famous case of Bernkrant v. Fowler 8 the California court was
faced with an oral contract to make a will
which was negotiated in Nevada in favor
of a Nevada plaintiff. The consideration
for the promise to make the will was that
the plaintiff refinance his obligation and
pay a substantial part of the indebtedness
on a piece of Nevada land before the due
(late of the debt. In return the decedent
promised forgiveness if there was any
amount due and owing at the time of his
death. The decedent died domiciled in
California, a state, whose Statute of Frauds
declares oral contracts to make a will invalid. The Nevada rule is to the contrary.
Justice Traynor, in a landmark opinion,
decided that it was not the purpose of the
California Statute of Frauds to reach a
contract so heavily centered in Nevada.
Professor Cavers' hypothetical twists the
facts somewhat so that plaintiff is a Cali-

How does one assess the above argument? Does it really make that much difference to California that this individual
contract be denied enforcement? Will the
impact on plans, hopes and expectations
be altered throughout that great state
simply because of the enforcement of this
isolated contract? I think not. Yet, I believe Cavers to be correct.
The law is a teacher and an educator.
No teacher is able to instruct in a vacuum.
And the law does not do its teaching in a
vacuum. It calls, upon the events which

erty located there, and the decedent-vendor
a California domiciliary at the time of the
refinancing. If the decedent had become
a Nevadan shortly before his death whose
law would apply? Would we argue that
since the decedent died domiciled in a
state which enforces oral contracts to make
a will that the case is a false conflict?
Cavers concludes that California law should
apply thus denying the enforcement of the
contract. His reasoning is most interesting:

case deals with New York residents. I do

forian, 49 the promise made and the prop-

Surely the California statute is designed

not merely to balk frauds and perjuries
after the testator's death but also to exert
pressure upon people to put their testamentary promises in signed writings, to
discourage people from cherishing hopes,
making plans, and taking action on the

strength of oral promises of this sort. If
these purposes are to be effectuated, the
statute must have a present impact; the
undertaIking is born defective and remains
so unless and until the promise is reduced

to writing and signed or an estoppel is
worked.--"
1s.55
Cal2d 588, 360 11.2d 906 (1961).
4!)D. Cavcrs, Oral Conlracts To Provide By Will

'rocess: Some notes on
and the Choice-of-Law
Bernkrant published in PERSPECTIVES OF LAW,
ESSAYS FOR AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT 38,
60 (1964).
-r"Id. at 60.

transpire before it for its instruction-they

are its primer. To say that a contract
made totally in California and invalid
under its law is not part of California
jurisprudence is to utter an absurdity. I
believe the same applies to an accident in
Ontario between a New York host-guest.
The statement by Ontario law that the
evils of insurance fraud are so great that
they dwarf the normal compensatory rule
of tort liability is a powerful one indeed.
I do not see that Ontario has lost the right
to make the statement merely because the
not think that they should impose their
solution on this particular problem. But,
to argue that a false conflict case has due
process and full faith and credit implications is to presume too much.5
Again, even if we conclude that in the
classic false conflict setting Ontario ought

not to apply its law, I think it rather
clear that with regard to the educational
dimension of law as the "time and space"
elements gravitate to Ontario it is no longer unfair for Ontario to do so. And the
point comes when the opposite is true. Not
only does Ontario have the right to do so
but it becomes the proper thing to do.
It is proper not only for Ontario, but for
New York as well since each state should
be willing to recognize

the educational

function of law in another jurisdiction.
It goes without saying that I disagree
strongly with the Cavers critics who argue
that a retrenching on his Principles of
•"Currie, The Constitution And The Choice of

Law: Governmental Interests And The Judicial
Function, 26 U CHI L REV 9, 21 (1958) reprinted
in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAY ON THE CON-

FLICT OF LAWS 188, 200 (1963). There may indeed he instances when a false conflict may have
due process implications but overuse of this argument in a standard F-X type case is, in the author's
view, unsupportable.
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Preferences is-in order. 52 The task is now
to learn to work with the tools which he
has provided for us. This is a substantial
task; because as Cavers suggests his method
does not call for agreement on the particular principles or their applicability to
given fact situations.5 3 There is much
work to be done. To demonstrate the
workability of the Cavers' principles I
shall now briefly focus on their applicability to the already decided Pennsylvania
cases.
CIPOLLA AND THE LOCUS OF
THE RELATIONSHIP
Cipolla v. Shaposka has relationship
problems. Given the state of the record
in the case it is not at all clear that by
focussing more heavily on the factual context of the relationship that the court'
could have reached a different result. It
should have, however, explored the possibility. The decision to apply Delaware
law would have been all the more meaningful. Even if the majority could afford
the luxury of less than careful examination
of the facts, it seems clear that the lone
dissenter, Mr. Justice Roberts, could have
milked the facts of this case to support
his result on more traditional grounds.
The relationship between the host and
guest is the focal point of Cipolla. Where
and how the relationship was entered into
cannot be irrelevant to the resolution of
the case. These facts not only affect this
author's predilections on how to resolve
this conflict problem but are crucial to a
court which has openly embraced Cavers'
principles of preference as the Pennsylvania court has done. When the court
adopted Cavers' territorial principle favoring the lower standard of liability of the
state of conduct and injury it was certainly
aware of the caveat built into that principle viz. that it only applied "where the
person injured was not so related to the
person causing the injury that the question
should be relegated to the law governing
the relationship."54
Where the "seat of
the relationship" is a state which has a
52Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance For
Progress? Reflections On Reading Cavers, The
Choice-of-Law Process, 46 TEX L REV 141 (1967),
and Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution In Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARV L REV

377 (1966).
53Cavers, supra note 4 at 136.
541d. at 146.

higher standard of financial protection
than the state of injury, Cavers' fourth
principle
of preference selects that law to
55
govern.
Admittedly seeking the "seat of the relationship" is a difficult task. Some have
despaired of ever determining its locus.-,
And if it could be found, it is argued,
that it is of questionable relevance. 7 Having argued so strongly in favor of a territorial bias earlier in this article it might
appear unseemly to favor the anti-territorial "relationship" principle. However,
the "time and space" elements of a conflict case can make the relationship between the parties the dominant influence
in deciding between two interested juris4ictions.58 As such, even an anti-territorial
"relationship'! principle takes on a "territorial cast-but now it is the "territory"
in which the relationship is centered.
Now back to Cipolla. In this case the
record indicates that the defendant, Shaposka, drove the plaintiff-Cipolla home on
the fateful day because defendant wanted
to pick up, some tools' he had lent the
plaintiff.59 It is also clear that defendant
drove the plaintiff home on numerous occasions when he had difficulty getting (a
ride home. 60 Is this sufficient to invoke
the anti-territorial "relationship" principle and thus apply the Pennsylvania higher standard of financial protection? I
think not. But, in all honesty one must
admit that there is a slight tug toward
finding a Pennsylvania relationship. Assume, however, that defendant Shaposka
has come to Pennsylvania to study for final
exams with plaintiff-Cipolla. If Shaposka
had driven back to school and the accident
had occurred in Delaware, a stronger case
could be made out for the Pennsylvania
relationship so that Pennsylvania law
might govern. It might well be that Cavers
would support.such a conclusion. One can
only .guess since Cavers leaves that question somewhat open. He raises the following question:
551d. at 166.
6Rosenberg, supra note 43 at 463.
571d.
5sin certain cases, such as in Dym v. Gordon or
Tooker -v. Lopez, the "time and space" elements
may so dominate the case that even if the case is
analytically a false conflict, the territorial law
should govern., See text accompanying footnote 39.
59Deposition of M. F. Cipolla, Record, Vol. 1, at
16a. Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa 563, 267 A2d 854

(1970).

6ODeposition of John Shaposka, Id. at 37.
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tor to his home and on the way back before crossing the Delaware line is involved
in an accident in which the doctor is injured. To argue for the application of
Pennsylvania law in this instance does not
upset me since the case is essentially a
"Pennsylvania case." The Pennsylvania relationship has time and space dimensions
and can be defended as being crucial to
the resolution of the case.
Notwithstanding my own bias as to how
to handle the "relationship" issue and my
conclusion that on any reading of the facts
in this case Delaware law should apply. I
am genuinely sorry that the decision did
not focus in on this problem. As precedent, it would have made the decision a
far more potent one. For the majority it
would have meant shaping the contours
of Cavers' second principle of preference
upon which they relied. It would have
said that unless the relationship between
plaintiff and defendant is more clearly a
Pennslyvania one, Delaware law will apTranslating the above into Cipolla facts
ply.
The dissent could have argued for the
it appears that Cavers would suggest that
application
of Pennsylvania law on someif a nominal Pennsylvania relationship bething
more
than-equal interest + better
tween Cipolla and Shaposka could be eslaw - common law liability. At the very
tablished then it might be fair to apply
Pennsylvania law to the case. If the mere least, the dissent should have sought to
the strong Delaware
fact that the parties entered into the car wrench this'case from
on
its
face. The pattern
which
appear
ties
to make a trip together from Pennsylvania
of
driving
the
plaintiff home
and
practice
is enough to build a Pennsylvania relationship then perhaps the fact that the purpose to Pennsylvania and the trip in this inpick up tools from the plaintiff
of the trip was a Pennsylvania act (the stance to
in
Pennsylvania
would go a long way toreturning of defendant's tools in Pennsylward
making
the
dissent's conclusion to
vania) is sufficient to establish a Pennsyllaw a credible one.
apply
Pennsylvania
vania relationship.
it
would
have permitted Mr.
Furthermore,
pushed
to
At this point, I find myself
greater
leeway in future
Roberts
Justice
an even stronger territorial bias than Caylaw where the
the
territorial
to
apply
cases
ers. It seems to me that the "seat of the
so
clearly visible.
are
not
factors
of
state
out
relationship" rule requires stronger "time
and space" considerations than Cavers alTHE FORGOTTEN ELSTON CASE
lows. If the territorialconsiderations which
The
Pennsylvania court correctly characI have developed earlier have any validity
then they cannot be side-tracked by syn- terized Cipolla as a true conflict case. It
thetic relationships which have no "time also concluded that it could seek little
and space" dimensions. I am willing to direction from prior Pennsylvania conflict
support the application of anything but cases since they were false conflict cases. I
Delaware law when a Delaware driver is am puzzled. In 1966 the Pennsylvania Sudriving*in his own home state unless the preme Court decided a rather important
Pennsylvania relationship between the true conflict case. For some inexplicable
plaintiff and defendant has true depth and reason it did not even rate a footnote
dimension to it. I can envisage a case citation in Cipolla. Tis a shame that the
where a Delaware citizen drives into Penn- only clearly relevant authority was so
sylvania and requests a Pennsylvania doc- blatantly ignored.
The case is Elston v. Industrial Lift
tor to come to his home for an emergency
house call. The Delawarean drives the doc- Truck Co. 62 A Pennsylvania resident workSuppose, however, that one or both of the
parties came from the state of injury or
from another state with a guest-passenger
statute. Does the fact that the relationship
was created in New York (a common law
jurisdiction) override this circumstance?
Ought New York law still to be viewed as
controlling a guest passenger relationship
created in New York between two Ontario
citizens in view of that province's refusal
to allow a guest to recover under any circumstances? I should think an affirmative answer to that question very doubtful, despite the fact the principle may in
terms appear to cover it. More however
can be said for applying New York law to
a New York driver who injures an Ontario
guest in Ontario or even for giving its
benefit to a New York guest who is in
Ontario by his Ontario driver, the relationship having in both cases begun in New
York. (Parentheses, explantions and emphasis added.)61

61Cavers, supra note 16 at 175.

62420

Pa 97, 216 A2d 318 (1966).
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ing in New Jersey was injured there while
operating a fork-lift truck purchased from
a Pennsylvania corporation. Elston, the
injured workman sought and received
workmen's compensation benefits pursuant
to the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act. Subsequently, Elston filed suit
for negligence in Pennsylvania against Industrial Lift Truck Co., the manufacturer
of the lift-truck. Industrial then sought
to join Elston's New Jersey employer by
filing a third-party complaint alleging that
the employer by reason of its conduct was
jointly and severally liable. The New Jersey employer sought to resist the joinder
claiming that New Jersey law insulated
him from liability since it provides that
when an employee entitled to workmen's
compensation benefit pursues a common
law action against a third party based upon
negligence, the third party is barred from
joining and claiming contribution from
the plaintiff's. statutory employer. Industrial, the Pennsylvania corporation seeking
the joinder, argued that Pennsylvania law
should govern since it permits a. joinder
limiting the contribution of the statutory
employer to the extent of his liability
under workmen's compensation.
Mr. Justice Roberts, put the issue very
clearly in focus:
In the instant case, however, Industrial,
the party asserting a right to contribution,
is a stranger to the compensation system.
And, in a narrow sense, unlike an employee covered by New Jersey's compensation program it received no quid pro
quo from that state to compensate for the
loss of its right to contribution.The issue then very simply is, that a Pennsylvania domiciliary seeks recovery (con-

tribution) from a New Jersey defendant.
New Jersey law will not permit contribution because it has provided for a compensation plan which does not load the cost
of contribution on the employer even if
he is negligent. On the other hand the

plaintiff seeking the contribution is not
a New Jerseyite. New Jersey's workmen's
compensation problems are not his concern and his state has sought to spread

the cost of industrial accidents in a different manner. How resolve this conflict?
The Pennsylvania court concluded that
New Jersey law must govern. Why?
63216

A2d at 323.

[W]ere Industrial to prevail, the Pennsylvania policy of permitting contribution
would be imposed upon the New Jersey
program of workmen's compensation.
Pennsylvania thus, would interject a limitation on the manner by which New Jersey
could determine to meet the social costs
of its industrial accidents. Such an approach, in our view would be unsound.
The extent to which the New Jersey program of workmen's compensation should
assimilate the equities underlying contribution is a determination more appropri64
ately to be made by that state.
Are we truly to believe that an occasional
third party contribution suit will throw
the costing of New Jersey Workmen's Compensation program out of kilter? I suggest
that what the Pennsylvania court did in
Elston is adopt Cavers' second principle
of preference just as they did in Cipolla.
The court viewed it as unfair for a New
Jersey employer who acted and caused injury in New Jersey to be subjected to
Pennsylvania law simply because a Pennsylvania corporation would be adversely affected if New Jersey law would apply. Since
the Elston facts did not indicate any special
Pennsylvania relationship which would
take the case out of the operation of Cavers' second territorial principle the court
decided to apply the New Jersey law which
denied liability. The principle applied
seems to be a rational one. The integrity
of any state's system of law should not be
tampered with merely because there are
out-of-state side effects. Very special circumstances must exist for an anti-territorial
principle to operate and when they are
not clearly in focus the territorial bias
stands firm.
In failing to draw the Elston analogy
the majority missed a golden opportunity
to place the Cipolla case in a broader context thus demonstrating the overall utility
of principles of preferences not only as an
analytical tool but also as method of effectively predicting results in conflicts
cases. Elston strengthened their position
considerably. Mr. Justice Roberts who
authored all of the very excellent preCipolla Pennsylvania conflict opinions including Elston, in failing to discuss the
impact of Elston has left us guessing as to
his future choice-of-law methodology. The
two cases can without doubt be distin641d. at 324.
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guished. I do not believe, however, that
they are poles apart. Though expectancy
and reliance interests differ in the two
cases I am unwilling to accept these arguments as the basis of the territorial preference in Elston over the domiciliary interest to Cipolla. Something more must
support the differing results.

tion of a host-guest case. In close cases the
ability to convince a court which is willing
to accept a territorial argument could depend'on the ability of the lawyer to paint
the kind of picture which brings out its
territorial dimensions.

WORDS OF CAUTION

The territorial bias of Cipolla v. Shaposka augers well for the development of conflict of law. The decision is strong not because it adopted a Cavers' principle of preference or because it indulged in a rigorous
interest anaylsis. The strength of Cipolla
lies in the willingness of the court to trust
its judicial instincts of fairness and justice
to the parties over the overly sophisticated
attempts of the scholars to intellectualize
legal concepts to the point of absurdity.
Having attempted to support with argumentation that the territorial bias is based
on some rather common sense notions about
law and its functions in our complex world,
I revel in the courts decision. Even handed justice had a good day in Pennsylvania.

To the embattled attorney faced with
evaluating a conflicts case under pressures
of everyday practice, it is quite evident
that this area of the law is altogether too
complex. If an attempt is to be made,
however, to fashion sensible territorial
arguments to convince a court the lawyer
will have to pay careful attention to the
factual nuances of the case before him.
Where the relationship of the parties was
entered into, what was the purpose of the
trip; was the trip an isolated instance or
part of a continuing relationship etc., are
examples of the kinds of questions that
must be probed in depth in the prepara-

CONCLUSION

DRI Expert Witness Index Expands
The use of expert witnesses for case investigation, examinations, or
testing and in the litigation of lawsuits, is steadily increasing. As the field
of product liability and other areas of tort law become more sophisticated,
the need for qualified experts expands.
The Defense Research Institute has on file the names of over 1200
qualified experts in such diversified fields as automobile reconstruction,
machine design, safety engineering, agricultural engineering and environmental pollution. Biographical information is provided to members, but
no published listing is available.
The new DRI Information Bulletin which explains utilization of
DRI services, including the Expert Witness Index, is available upon request.
Defense Research Institute
1212 West Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233

